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OBSTACLES TO THE DEVOLUTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: STATES’
SELF-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON RULEMAKING
ANDREW HECHT†
ABSTRACT
Federal decision makers considering a policy of devolving the
responsibility for environmental protection to the states need to consider
two kinds of limitations that states impose on their own rulemaking
powers. “No more stringent” rules prohibit the state from imposing
regulations that are more stringent than counterpart federal regulations;
Private property rights acts discourage regulations that limit an owner’s use
of private property. This Note surveys twenty-seven “no more stringent”
rules and twenty private property rights acts. It analyzes the extent to which
they inhibit states from filling gaps caused by the rollback of federal
authority. Each set of state rules is then ranked on a relative stringency
scale. A case study analysis is used to show how a rollback in federal Clean
Water Act authority might affect the assumption of responsibility to
provide environmental protection to wetlands.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After thirty years of federal dominance in the sphere of environmental
protection, there are increasing calls for transfer of responsibility for
environmental protection to the states. Consequently, a general policy of
devolving responsibility from the federal government to the states is
gaining support at the national level. In fact, it is among the goals
expressed by former Utah Governor Mike Leavitt, the recently appointed
head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1 While devolution of
federal power is not limited to the field of environmental protection, it does
present unique problems in this area where few issues are neatly confined
within state political boundaries.

1. Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to Provide a Procedure By
Which the States May Propose Constitutional Amendments: Hearing on H.R.J. 84 Before the House
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of
Governor Mike Leavitt) (“Our mission . . . should be to restore the original balance between states and
the national government. The best way to do that is for the states to be stronger. Stronger states will
produce a better national government.”).

HECHT.DOC

Fall 2004]

2/23/2005 4:08 PM

OBSTACLES TO DEVOLUTION

107

The issue of devolution recently came to a head in the aftermath of the
2001 Supreme Court decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.2 Until this decision, one
of the most sweeping federal environmental protections for water quality
was jurisdictionally based on the “Migratory Bird Rule,” declaring that
Clean Water Act (CWA) jurisdiction will attach to any water that is used,
or would be used, by birds in their seasonal migrations.3 In effect, this rule
granted jurisdiction over every surface water in the United States. In
SWANCC, however, the Supreme Court declared that the Migratory Bird
Rule could no longer serve as the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction over
certain intrastate, nonnavigable waters.4
The Court’s opinion had important federalist overtones: There are
waters of the United States, which implies there are waters of the states.5
By extension, since the decision permanently excluded a category of
“isolated” waters from federal control under the CWA, the Court
essentially demanded that states protect these “isolated” waters if they are
to receive any protection at all. Despite the clarity in federalist ideology,
the opinion was less than clear about which waters would be considered
“isolated” for jurisdictional purposes.6
To resolve this uncertainty, EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to solicit public comment on the jurisdictional limits of the
CWA.7 Over 100,000 public comments were submitted, including
comments from national environmental organizations, major industry
associations of the regulated community, and forty-six states.8
Industry groups, encouraged by the possibility of replacing
cumbersome federal rules with potentially friendlier state rules, focused on
one of the purposes of the CWA “to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use . . . of land and water
resources . . . .”9 They argued that a focus on state control was not only
2. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].
3. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2003), clarified in 53 Fed. Reg. 20,765 (June 6, 1988); 51 Fed. Reg.
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
4. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 159.
5. Id. at 174.
6. Id. at 171-72.
7. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
“Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1,991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
8. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers & the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of the United
States” (April 16, 2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050)
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
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consistent with the CWA, but furthermore was necessary to rein in federal
environmental protections that had become so sweeping that they
unconstitutionally impinged on traditional notions of state sovereignty
envisioned by our federalist system.10
In response to concerns from environmentalists that more state control
would lead to a breakdown in environmental protection,11 the regulated
community argued that devolution was not a rollback, but merely a shift of
power.12 Thus, as the federal government steps out of its role, states would
step in to fill the jurisdictional gap and maintain a constant level of
environmental protection.
This scheme raises an obvious question: Can states really fill the gap?
In grappling with this issue, one is immediately confronted with legal
limitations that states impose on themselves to discourage state-level
environmental protection. Even where state agencies show a willingness to
fill the jurisdictional gap, the majority of state environmental agencies are
hampered by one of two forms of legal limitations: “no more stringent”
rules (NMSRs) and private property rights acts (PPRAs).13
So before one can answer whether states could indeed fill a
jurisdictional gap, therefore, one needs to understand these legal
limitations. How far do they reach? How do they serve to block state
rulemaking? What are their policy justifications?

10. See, e.g., The Foundation for Environmental and Economic Progress et al., Comments in
Response to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of
the United States” (Apr. 16, 2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1829) [hereinafter FEEP Comments].
11. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council et al., Comments for the EPA Water Docket
(Apr. 16, 2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1674) [hereinafter Joint Greens Comment].
12. See, e.g., FEEP Comments, supra note 10.
13. Even where state agencies are free to create environmental regulation in the absence of
NMSRs and PPRAs, they are still bound by the jurisdictional limits that are set for them by the state
legislature. In the field of water quality management, they are limited by the state’s definition of
“waters of the state, or its equivalent,” in the same way that EPA and USACE are limited by the
definition of “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). Although states are free to
define “waters of the state” as broadly as they choose—they are not bound by the Commerce Clause—
they sometimes, be it through purpose, carelessness or lack of scientific knowledge at the time of
drafting, have created situations where they have excluded certain waters from this definition. For
example, in North Carolina, the definition of “waters of the state” does not include wetlands, only
“swamps.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212(6) (2003). If “swamps” were to be interpreted as “traditional
swamps,” then many wetlands could be excluded, like ones without year-round standing water. See
Elizabeth Hendrix, The Legal Status and Protection of North Carolina’s Isolated Wetlands 19-22 (2003)
(unpublished Master’s Project, Duke University) (on file with the Nicholas School of the Environment,
Duke University). It is important to recognize that these state-to-state definitions of territorial waters are
additional limitations on the ability of states to fill jurisdictional gaps. However, they are outside the
scope of this paper, which is focused on deliberate limitations to rulemaking.
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The purpose of this Note is to help answer the following question: In
light of “no more stringent” rules and private property rights acts, would
states be able to maintain federal levels of environmental protection?
Following up on the SWANCC comments that prompted this Note, it
focuses specifically on the issue of water quality.
Part II explains in more detail the policy justifications for devolution
of federal power, and how and why some states have responded with selfimposed limitations. Part III is a taxonomy of NMSRs, followed by a
categorization of each state. Part IV repeats this analytical process for
PPRAs. Part V uses the state-by-state stringency categorizations to indicate
how effectively states with high wetland acreages will be able to fill the
gaps from any rollback in federal jurisdiction.
The analysis in Part V should provide an understanding of the
interplay between state rulemaking limitations and wetland endowments,
but it does not purport to make any conclusions about actual state by state
responses to a federal rollback. The Note intends, rather, to give observers
an idea of the extent to which states may be inhibited from filling gaps in
federal protection of water quality. Thus, for example, it would be
fallacious to conclude that a given stringency will result in a given acreage
of unprotected wetlands. However, one could reasonably conclude that a
state with a high stringency score and a large acreage of wetlands would
have trouble maintaining existing levels of federal protection, if it chose to
maintain protections at all. Furthermore, while many of the statutes
considered are of general applicability, one should exercise care in
extrapolating to issues other than water quality. The taxonomic keys were
designed based on a survey of water quality related statutes alone.
II. STATE RESPONSES TO DEVOLUTION
A. Debating Devolution
The argument over devolution is, at its core, an argument over
competing theories of efficient administration. Which of the governments
in our federal system—state or federal—is better able to meet the needs of
interested parties in a swift and satisfactory manner? This is a general
question, and it spans much more than environmental issues, although
those are all that are considered here.
It is important to distinguish devolution from cooperative federalism.
Under cooperative federalism, the federal government delegates certain
programmatic powers to the states, with the understanding that the states
shall meet minimum requirements, and that the federal government may

HECHT.DOC

Fall 2004]

2/23/2005 4:08 PM

OBSTACLES TO DEVOLUTION

110

intervene to the extent that states do not live up to their obligations.14 The
devolution considered in this paper occurs when the federal government
withdraws its rulemaking authority. This withdrawal may occur when the
federal government voluntarily abandons its rulemaking powers, or when
its declines to assert its power to the extent permissible under the
Constitution.15 In either case, states are forced to create and enforce their
own regulations to protect environmental resources that lose federal
protection.
The arguments in favor of devolution have an intuitive appeal.
Proponents argue that state and local governments are closer to affected
parties, which makes them both more sensitive and more responsive to
local needs.16 Furthermore, this proximity allows for regulations tailored to
specific local circumstances. Through devolution, “one-size-fits-all”
national regulations and their consequent inefficiencies can be replaced
with targeted regulations that achieve the same benefits at lower cost.17
Finally, from a constitutional standpoint, those powers not delegated to the
federal government are reserved for the states under the Tenth
Amendment,18 and there are no enumerated powers specifically directed to
the environment.
The arguments against devolution are also compelling. First,
ecological boundaries are quite distinct from political boundaries; therefore
national standards are the most effective way to ensure consistent treatment
of ecosystems that span political jurisdictions. Second, if states are allowed
to have non-uniformity in their regulations, many commentators predict
that it will lead to a so-called “race to the bottom,” in which competitive
economic pressures harm social welfare by forcing states to lower their
levels of environmental protection—thereby lowering the cost of doing
business—to attract industry to the state.19 While this outcome is not

14. For example, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting program under
§ 402 of the CWA is a delegated program that would be considered an effort in cooperative federalism.
The federal government authorizes states to issue discharge permits, but retains the ability to demand
stricter permit limits, and to enforce against noncompliant permittees. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
15. For example, in SWANCC, the Supreme Court never concluded whether Congress could
regulate “isolated” wetlands under its Commerce power; it merely stated that Congress did not clearly
intend to exercise its Commerce power to its fullest extent. SWANCC v. USACE, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73
(2001). Therefore, in the case of wetland regulation, the devolution occurs as a byproduct of the
SWANCC decision and Congress’ failure to assert its Commerce power fully in the interim.
16. James L. Huffman, Thirtieth Anniversary Edition Essays: The Past and Future of
Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23, 31 (2000).
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
19. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To
the Bottom?”, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 283-84 (1997) (debating the existence of a race to the bottom).
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certain,20 the very fact that “no more stringent” rules exist suggests that
states believe a race to the bottom is possible (if not likely), and that they
need to protect their statewide industry from anticompetitive environmental
regulation. In this sense, states are not worried about racing to the bottom;
rather, they do not want to get stuck at the top. Finally, even though many
business entities favor devolution because it allows them to exert pressure
on a smaller political body, others are less sanguine, because it means a
patchwork of state laws to follow as opposed to a single national
regulation.21 Likewise, for smaller regional firms competing with national
competitors, uniform environmental rules ensure a level playing field.22
There is no consistent state response to the possibility of devolution.
In some cases, states welcome the increased authority. In its comments on
the SWANCC decision, Alaska eagerly requested the opportunity to set its
own wetland policy.23 Many other states, in particular those with many
bordering states, oppose devolution of federal control out of a fear of crossborder externalities resulting from states with weaker regulations.24
If a state has an interest in protecting its resources, there is no question
that it may exercise its power to extend protection to environmental
resources within its territorial borders. By way of its police power, which
gives a state the right to protect the public health, welfare, and safety, the
state could allow its environmental agencies to promulgate regulations that
meet or even exceed prior federal rules.25
20. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210-1212 (1992)
(challenging the race to the bottom theory in the environmental context).
21. A Conversation on Federalism and the States: The Balancing Act of Devolution, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 1091, 1095-96 (2001) (David L. Markell, moderator) (discussing the relative advantages of non
uniform rules).
22. See id. at 1096 (opining on the effect a set of uniform laws would have on variably sized
businesses).
23. See Letter from Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska, to the E.P.A. (Apr. 16, 2003) (on file
with E.P.A.) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1274) (commenting on the Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of the United States,” and stating
that, “[w]e . . . believe states should be afforded much deference in land use and natural resource
management. . . . Alaska has demonstrated that it is willing and able to protect its natural resources and
the environmental quality of our state.”).
24. See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey Wennberg, Comm’r, Department of Environmental
Conservation, Agency of Natural Resources, Vt. (2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1330)
(commenting on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of “Waters in the United States,” and stating that, “Vermont is dependent on the protection
of resources in other states in order to maintain Vermont’s exceptional natural resources. Also, Vermont
is in a keen race with other states for economic development and should not be disadvantaged in that
competition by ad hoc decisions that relax regulatory requirements in other regions of the country.”).
25. See Revesz, supra note 20, at 1228 (noting that some states have promulgated standards more
stringent than federal standards in a variety of other environmental areas).
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But just because states have the right to extend such protections does
not mean that their agencies are permitted freely to do so. It is here that the
legal limitations to be discussed in this Note come into play. There are
various policy justifications for these limitations, mentioned below, but
they all share a common feature: The legal limitations are created by the
state legislature to restrict the state’s inherent right to make environmental
rules.
Finally, a brief word is warranted for the significant budget deficits
currently facing states. For the 2004 fiscal year, every state except North
Dakota, Wyoming, and New Mexico has shortfalls.26 Even in the absence
of legal limitations, these deficits suggest that states will be hesitant to fund
the expansion of environmental programs that were formerly paid for by
the federal government. Although budgetary concerns are a strong
immediate argument against devolution, budgets may fluctuate and the
argument may lose force in the future. The legal limitations, however, will
still be obstacles to environmental rulemaking even if state governments
are flush with funds to spend on environmental protection.
B. “No More Stringent” Rules
“No more stringent” rules, in their general form, require that state
agencies not impose environmental regulations that are more stringent than
those that are, or could be, imposed by the federal government.27 These
rules come in many varieties,28 with significantly different levels of
stringency, but by definition, all “no more stringent” rules affect limits that
may be imposed, technology requirements, and other quantifiable
standards. As long as federal environmental laws remain in place, and
retain jurisdiction over large portions of the country, the consequences of
these NMSRs are minimal.
NMSRs are not constitutional and can therefore be overridden by the
legislative process. For example, Wisconsin passed a preemptive SWANCC
gap-filling measure in 2001, overriding their NMSR in the wetland
context.29 Of course, whether other states will follow suit is an impossible
question to answer, although it is worth noting that an effort is underway to

26. Andrew Murr & Jennifer Ordonez, Tarnished Gold, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, at 33, 35
(inset) (highlighting deficits that include CA at $38 billion; NY $9.3 billion; TX $3.7 billion; and NC
$2 billion).
27. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-40-4.1 (1993) (“No rule . . . may be more stringent than
any corresponding federal law, rule, or regulation governing an essentially similar subject or issue.”).
28. See rules cited infra note 42.
29. See 2001 Wis. Laws 6 (extending protection to “nonfederal” wetlands).
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encourage just such a trend.30 In any case, it is important to remember that
the upper extreme of most NMSRs are not part of state constitutions and
can therefore be overridden by the ordinary legislative process.
The policy justifications for NMSRs are clearly based on concerns
with states’ inability to compete economically that may arise as a
consequence of devolution.31 State legislatures do not want their
environmental rulemaking agencies to promulgate (or in some cases
maintain) regulations that are any stronger than necessary for fear that
those regulations will raise the cost of doing business in the state, leading
to a flight of industry and jobs.32 Whether such a flight would in fact
happen is debatable, especially considering that some economically
competitive states like California have passed rules more stringent than
those required by the federal government,33 but the fear is quite real.34
NMSRs interfere with gap-filling directly by imposing a cap on the
standards that a state agency may require; they turn federal floors into
regulatory ceilings. For statutes that impose a jurisdictional cap, the state
agency would not be able to require permits or engage in enforcement
actions against facilities that do not remain under federal jurisdiction. In
these cases, gap-filling is per se prohibited. For the more benign statutes
that allow exemptions for certain regulations, the gap-filling is not
necessarily prohibited per se, but merely delayed and discouraged by the
various hoops that the state agency must jump through in order to
promulgate a rule. In these cases, the NMSRs have a deterrent effect on
state regulators, in effect forcing them to think twice before proposing a
rule not demanded by federal law.
C. Private Property Rights Acts
Private property rights acts are indirect limitations to gap-filling, but
just as much of an obstacle to environmental protection. In their basic form,
PPRAs require that state rulemaking agencies evaluate whether a rule or
30. See Model State Wetland Statute to Close the Gap Created by SWANCC (Feb. 22, 2001)
(furthering the effort of the Association of State Wetland Managers, which has created model
legislation to fill the SWANCC gap), available at http://www.aswm.org/swp/model-leg.pdf.
31. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental
Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems,
54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1388-90 (1995) (stating that, “[g]iven that state legislatures may believe that their
state is competing with other states for industrial and commercial development, state legislatures also
understandably may seek a competitive advantage by minimizing the state agencies’ ability to impose
environmental regulations”).
32. See, e.g. Revesz, supra note 20, at 1228 (noting that Connecticut had supported more stringent
environmental regulations until realizing the damaging economic impact they might have).
33. See id at 1228-29 (discussing California’s pollution control requirements for automobiles).
34. See generally Engel, supra note 19.
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exaction will cause a taking, and they implement safeguards to ensure that
agency actions do not cause a taking. To determine what constitutes a
taking, the PPRAs typically impose Supreme Court Fifth Amendment case
law at the state level, either through codification or incorporation by
reference.35 Furthermore, a number of these PPRAs expand the definition
of private property, creating the real possibility that an action that could be
undertaken by the federal government without causing a taking would, in
fact, result in a taking if that same action were performed by a branch of
the state government.
The justification for PPRAs is not directly linked to devolution. In
fact, they are a response to a perceived inadequacy of the courts to protect
the rights of private property owners.36 This reaction is not entirely
surprising in an era where Justice Blackmun could argue seriously in his
personal dissent to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that the owner
was not entitled to compensation as a result of a restrictive zoning rule
because his prime beachfront property could still be used as a place to
“picnic, camp in a tent, or live . . . in a movable trailer.”37 Even under the
majority opinion in Lucas, the threshold for triggering a taking is the
deprivation of all economically beneficial use.38 Only rarely will such a
high threshold be crossed. Responding to this perceived judicial
indifference to property owners, PPRAs place the initial burden of
evaluating the takings impact on private property at the agency level, well
before a controversy ever reaches the courts.
There are two ways in which PPRAs interfere with gap-filling,
depending on the type of statute. Those statutes that expand private
property rights, sometimes called “compensation” statutes,39 interfere by
lowering the threshold for what state action constitutes a taking. It is these
statutes that are the most serious obstacles, because they block state action
that might otherwise be legitimate if performed by the federal government.

35. This may seem superfluous, since the Fourteenth Amendment would apply this law to state
action regardless. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Indeed, many of the Supreme Court decisions stemmed
from controversies between property owners and state agencies. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Keep in mind, however,
that those statutes that codify the law (as opposed to those that incorporate it by reference), will retain
force even if federal takings law changes.
36. See Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Property Rights
Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 94-112 (2002) (arguing that property rights are inadequately
protected in the U.S. courts).
37. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1015-16.
39. Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 191 (1997).
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Those statutes that do not expand private property rights but merely
call for an evaluation prior to action, sometimes called “assessment”
statutes,40 are more indirect in their effect. By shifting the burden of
evaluating the taking on to the state agency, not only is the agency saddled
with additional administrative costs for each rule it must promulgate, but it
also must face the public spotlight and political pressure. This pressure
would tend to discourage far-reaching regulations by political actors
concerned with appeasing key constituents in the regulated community.
Consequently, the agency would likely scale back the scope of some
environmental rules so as not to seem overly aggressive during the
assessment phase.
III. TAXONOMY OF “NO MORE STRINGENT” RULES
Mechanically, NMSRs leave a significant portion of the responsibility
for environmental decisionmaking to the federal government, because the
state is in effect deferring to federal standards. Thus, as long as the federal
government continues to exert broad power over environmental matters,
the practical effect of NMSRs is slight, because the federal rules will
themselves govern the field. But should federal jurisdiction lapse, as some
suggest could happen with isolated wetlands because of the SWANCC
decision,41 “no more stringent” rules could be seriously tested. Would a
federal rollback of jurisdiction require a state rollback? Or is a NMSR only
about deferring to federal standard-setting, and distinct from jurisdictional
issues? Is there any way to work around these self-imposed limitations on
rulemaking in cases of state-specific need? To answer these questions, it is
important to look at the NMSRs themselves and identify features that
contribute to their severity.

40. Id. at 190.
41. See FEEP Comments, supra note 10.
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The set of twenty-seven NMSRs surveyed here42 represent those
NMSRs in the United States that apply to rulemaking related to water
quality. Seventeen states have NMSRs of general applicability, meaning
that they apply to all water quality rules (and in some cases all
environmental rules).43 Another ten have rules that apply only to a specific
category of regulation (for example, underground storage tanks).44 Of the
twenty-seven NMSRs, twenty-four are statutes, two are executive orders,45
and one is a binding policy statement.46 The fact that two NMSRs are
executive orders does not change their practical effect. Although they are
certainly easier to override (only the will of the governor is required), for
most purposes they are the same in language and intent as the statutory
NMSRs, just promulgated by a different branch of government.
This taxonomy identifies a basic set of distinct features in NMSRs
whose presence makes a NMSR more severe. The most difficult aspect of
creating this taxonomy was achieving the proper level of generality. While
a few of the NMSRs seem like clones of one another, others are specific
enough in their language that they could merit feature categories entirely to
themselves. But such a fine level of detail would undermine the more
general intentions of this Note, and it would subject the analysis to a
potentially obfuscating degree of hair-splitting. In order to achieve the
analytic goals of this Note, the taxonomy uses only groups with more than
one member (although some only have two). While this grouping scheme

42. The list originated with a footnote in Jerome Organ’s foundation article, Organ, supra note 31,
at 1376 n.13. It is updated here in response to additions, deletion, modifications and code renumberings
in the almost ten years since Professor Organ’s article. ALA. CODE §§ 22-35-10 (USTs), 22-36-7
(wellheads) (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.365 (2004) (USTs); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 49-255.01
(AZPDES), 49-1009 (USTs) (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (2003) (USTs); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-8-202(8)(a) (2003); FLA. STAT. chs. 403.061(7), (31), 403.804(2) (West 2004); IDAHO
CODE § 39-3601 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE § 455B.173 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13A.120
(administrative regulations generally), 224.16-050 (NDPES) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 341-D(1-B) (West 2002); Exec. Order No. 01.01.1996.03, 23-4 Md. Reg. 193 (1996); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 49-17-34 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-203, 75-5-309 & 80-15-110 (2002); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-1505(22) (2003) (SDWA); NEV. REV. STAT. 459.824 (2004) (USTs); N.D. CENT. CODE §
23-01-04.1(1) (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.39 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, § 1-1-206 (2004);
OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.110(2) (2003) (forest operations); Penn. Exec. Order No. 1996-1 (1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-40-4.1 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-226(l) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-5105 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Michie 2000) (WWTPs); W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3 (2003);
Wis. Board Pol. NR 1.52(3) (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1416 (Michie 2003) (USTs).
43. Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
44. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
45. Maryland, Exec. Order No. 01.01.1996.03 (1996), and Pennsylvania, Penn. Exec. Order No.
1996-1 (1996).
46. Wisconsin, Wis. Board Pol. NR 1.52(3) (1996).
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obviously results in a loss of precision, all the major features in all the
NMSRs are accounted for, and on the whole the result—in the form of the
state-by-state ranked order—is consistent with what one would expect from
reading the NMSRs as a group.
In some instances, the feature names themselves seem awkwardly
phrased, but this contortion was necessary from an analytical standpoint to
arrange all the names such that the presence of the feature indicates an
increased stringency level.47 As a result, the features listed are distinct from
those that have been identified in the literature to date. Previous literature
has been more concerned with identifying features that create interpretive
problems, rather than features that create gap-filling problems.48 In no way
does this Note intend to downplay the importance of the earlier works—
indeed it would have been impossible without them—the Note merely
distinguishes the earlier linguistic taxonomies from its own functional
taxonomy.
A concomitant benefit to the use of a functional taxonomy is that the
Note can focus on readily identifiable features that may be read off the face
of a statute, without becoming dependent on shifting case law or having to
guess how courts will resolve the interpretive issues. The implicit
assumption, of course, is that a given term will, at some point in the future,
receive the same or similar interpretation across statutes.
A. Distinct Features of “No More Stringent” Rules
1. Affects Quantifiable Limits
This feature is basically the litmus test for inclusion in the NMSR
group.49 If a NMSR does not affect some kind of quantifiable limit,
procedural requirement, or technology standard, then it is not considered in
this Note. There is no attempt to distinguish between the stringency of
different kinds of limits, or even to answer, for example, what is a federal
standard.50 These interpretive issues are open questions that will be decided

47. But see infra Part III.B (discussing the exception to this rule for the Limited Applicability
feature that is a multiplier which reduces the overall score).
48. See, e.g., Organ, supra note 31.
49. If all NMSRs are included in this category, it seems like there is no purpose to it, because it
does not help distinguish between NMSRs. However, it must be included to account for the multiplier
for Limited Applicability, discussed infra Part III.A.6.
50. The questions of what is a “federal standard” and what is “stringent” are actually quite
important to the implementation of NMSRs, and a few courts have had occasion to consider them. E.g.,
Fla. Elec. Power Coord. Group v. Askew, 366 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a
state law requiring different pollution control “methods” for achieving temperature control were not
“more stringent” because they were not “in counterpoise” to federal standards); Franklin v. Natural Res.
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by the courts and their commentators; they do not affect the relative
stringency of a statute once we make the assumption that there will be some
consistent interpretation.
2. Jurisdictional Ties to Federal Regulation
Most “no more stringent” laws are silent on the issue most important
following SWANCC, namely, whether the absence of jurisdiction for the
federal government should preclude jurisdiction for the state regulatory
agency. Jurisdictional limitations are the most severe gap-filling limitation,
because they mean that the state agency is prohibited from protecting any
resource that cannot be protected under a federal statute. In the case of
SWANCC, a loss of federal jurisdiction over “isolated” wetlands would
mean that a state with a jurisdictional tie to the CWA would also be
precluded from regulating those waters.
Some NMSRs clearly separate jurisdictional issues from standards.
They focus exclusively on capping the state standards at federal levels,
ignoring whether the federal government would have jurisdiction to enforce
those standards in all instances. These rules are not included in this
category. Two examples are the NMSRs of Florida and Iowa.
The Florida law focuses on a “[standard] which has been set by
federal agencies pursuant to federal law or regulation.”51 The word “set” is
devoid of connotations of jurisdiction. This law suggests that what matters
is the limit that the federal government has deemed appropriate. It defers to
the federal environmental decisionmaking process. This law implies that
Florida is free to regulate waters that are non-jurisdictional under the
CWA, but any standards imposed must be “no more stringent” than the
federal government would impose if it did have jurisdiction.52
Iowa’s law is even more explicit. It states that a state standard may not
be more stringent than an “effluent standard or pretreatment standard
[promulgated] pursuant to . . . the federal Water Pollution Control Act . . .
for such a source.”53 By using “such a source,” the law is directed at a class
of sources—which is independent of jurisdiction—and not a particular
source that may or may not be jurisdictional. The practical ramifications
are the same as for Florida: Iowa is free to regulate CWA non-jurisdictional
waters, but for certain sources the limits that can be imposed are capped.

& Env. Prot. Cabinet, 799 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1990) (holding that a restricted hearing procedure was “more
stringent” than federal law because federal law did not require prepayment of fines).
51. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.804(2) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. IOWA CODE § 455B.173(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
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In the NMSRs which are included in this category, the rule language
asserts that state jurisdiction should be limited by federal jurisdiction.
Eleven rules are of this type.54 To determine whether a statute falls in this
category, the key question is whether the state rule ties itself directly to a
federal statute, which would imply that the state rule shall accomplish no
more protection than the federal statute, thus implicating jurisdiction. The
most common way of tying state rules to federal statutes is through
language whereby the state rule shall be “no more stringent” than
“corresponding federal law”55 or “federal regulations . . . that address the
same circumstances.”56
Mississippi is an example of this jurisdiction-tying approach. Its
NMSR declares that state rules “shall not exceed requirements of federal
statutes and federal regulations . . . .”57 Federal jurisdiction is automatically
implicated by using the term “requirements of federal statutes.” If the
federal statute cannot reach some environmental resources of the state,
Mississippi cannot impose standards that will. 58
Kentucky’s law achieves a jurisdictional tie in a more subtle way. It
prohibits the imposition of standards in a permit that are more stringent
than those “which would have been applicable under federal regulation if
the permit were issued by the federal government.”59 Although an argument
could be made that CWA non-jurisdictional waters can still be regulated by
the State, the plain reading of this statute is that if federal regulation cannot
impose the condition, neither can Kentucky.60 Federal jurisdiction is not
mentioned, but it is implied, because otherwise the act of issuing a permit is
irrelevant, and the quoted qualification could be reduced to a statement
about federal standards, as in Florida or Iowa.
The most direct of all jurisdictionally tied NMSRs is from Idaho,
which mentions the federal statute by name: “[R]ules promulgated under
this chapter [shall] not impose requirements beyond those of the federal
clean water act.”61 Here, there is no doubt that if the CWA cannot reach a
water, neither can Idaho’s state environmental agency.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See infra Table 2.
E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 1-40-4.1 (1993)
E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-203(1) (2002).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-17-34(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
Id.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.16-050(4) (2003) (emphasis added).
See id.
IDAHO CODE § 39-3601 (Michie 1997).
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3. Federal Silence Preempts
Many NMSRs apply in a blanket fashion, such that state agencies are
not only prohibited from exceeding existing federal standards, but also
prohibited from setting standards in areas62 that have not been addressed a
priori by federal standards. In essence, these laws place the full
responsibility for environmental regulation squarely with the federal
government. In most cases, it is impossible to tell whether federal silence is
meant to preempt state rulemaking. To identify those rules that are meant to
allow federal preemption of the field, one must look closely at the intent
behind the language. Among all the categories, this one strays furthest from
the realm of function into the realm of interpretation. For this reason, few
statutes are included in this category.
The Arkansas NMSR, for example, demands that the “regulations . . .
shall as much as possible be identical to and no more stringent than the
federal regulations adopted by [EPA].”63 The intent is clearly to keep the
state regulations consistent with federal regulations, which by necessity
would prevent the state from creating new regulations in the face of federal
silence.
A few NMSRs apply only when the federal government has spoken.
In other words, if the federal agency has set a standard, then a state agency
cannot exceed that standard; if the federal government has not set a
standard, then the state agency is free to act. Both Iowa and West Virginia
have NMSRs of this type. They are not included in this category.
Iowa’s law explicitly declares that federal silence does not prohibit the
imposition of a standard: “This section may not preclude . . . the
establishment of an effluence standard for a source or class of sources for
which the federal environmental protection agency has not promulgated
standards pursuant . . . to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.”64 In the
case of West Virginia: “In the absence of a federal rule, the adoption of a
state rule shall not be construed to be more stringent than a federal rule,
unless the absence of a federal rule is the result of a specific federal
exemption.”65
Regrettably, in the majority of cases, it is impossible to determine
whether a statute intends for federal silence to preempt state rulemaking.
Colorado’s NMSR exemplifies this difficulty. It states that the state
62. “Areas” is a broad term, which is in fact used by the Alaska statute. ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.03.365(c) (2002). As used here, the term includes all manner of sources, parameters, outfalls and
anything else that could be the substantive basis for a difference between two regulated activities.
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (2003).
64. IOWA CODE § 455B.173(2) (2003).
65. W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3a (2003).
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commission “may [not] adopt rules more stringent than corresponding
enforceable federal requirements.”66 Under one interpretation, the term
“enforceable” could be read to mean that federal silence only matters where
a federal statute is jurisdictional. This interpretation would create the
awkward situation where the state could potentially have two sets of rules,
one for CWA jurisdictional waters, and one for non-jurisdictional waters.
Under a different interpretation, “enforceable” could be read to mean that
the requirements must already exist before there is a stringency limitation;
in the absence of federal requirements, then, the state is free to act. This
latter interpretation seems more plausible; regardless, the statute was not
included in this category for lack of clarity.
4. Retroactive
Most NMSRs are prospective in nature, meaning that they only apply
to rules that are promulgated after the enactment of the NMSR. By being
prospective in application, they function to preserve the status quo at the
time of enactment. While these provisions may assist in the situation where
currently regulated waters are threatened with losing their existing
protections, they still serve as hurdles in the event that the state must enact
new rules to fill a jurisdictional gap created by a rollback of the CWA.
The Wisconsin policy statement is an example of a prospective
NMSR. It applies only when an agency “seeks to adopt” new rules after the
date of August 1, 1996.67 This policy statement clearly leaves in place rules
adopted prior to that date, and therefore prior to any future federal rollback.
Retroactive NMSRs are less common than prospective NMSRs, but
potentially quite devastating to preexisting state environmental protection
programs. A retroactive NMSR requires a review of in-place state rules,
and a withdrawal of those rules that could not be promulgated at the present
time because of the NMSR. Consider the hypothetical case of a state that
implemented its own CWA § 402 program and issued a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for an outfall into what
later became a CWA non-jurisdictional water because of a federal rollback.
Assuming that the NMSR affected jurisdiction,68 this permit could
potentially be declared invalid for lack of jurisdiction, and the state agency
would not be able to reassert authority. Retroactive rules may therefore
affect more than gap-filling; they may in fact re-open once-filled holes.
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-202(8)(a) (2003) (emphasis added) (allowing, however, more
stringent rules “only if it is demonstrated at a public hearing, and the commission finds, based on sound
scientific evidence . . . [that the rules] are necessary to protect the public health, beneficial use of water,
or the environment of the state.”).
67. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 1.52(3) (2004).
68. See supra Part III.A.1.
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Pennsylvania’s executive order is one of the few NMSRs clear in its
intent to apply retroactively: “Existing regulations shall be reviewed by
agencies for consistency [with the NMSR requirements]. Any regulations
that are inconsistent . . . shall be considered for amendment or repeal.”69
While this NMSR does not demand repeal in all instances, it clearly puts
preexisting rules in the spotlight.
When a statute is silent on whether it is prospective or retrospective,
that silence is assumed to be prospective. There are two reasons for this
assumption. First, the principle that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the
law”70 should apply equally to the states as to the federal government.
Second, the practice of this Note is to resolve ambiguity against inclusion.71
5. Exemptions
About half of the NMSRs have some form of exemption process that
allows a state agency to create a regulation more stringent than a federal
one. An exemption process has the potential for removing the teeth from an
NMSR. Whether this happens, however, entirely depends on how difficult
it is for the agency to earn the exemption. The simplest exemption
procedures require a statement of findings; more complicated ones require
public hearings; the most severe require detailed environmental and
economic impact studies, or some combination of findings and hearings.
When there is no exemption process, which is assumed when one is not
specifically created by the rule, the NMSR is considered more severe than
an otherwise identical NMSR that allows exemptions. Accordingly,
NMSRs that allow exemptions are considered less inhibitive of a state’s
ability to fill gaps in the federal regulatory scheme.
Maine has one of the simplest exemption procedures. It requires that
the agency identify “when feasible, and using information available to it,”
provisions of the proposed rule it “believes” would impose a regulatory
burden more stringent than that imposed by a federal standard, and then to
set forth a justification for the differences.72 This provision does not require
the agency to make any findings that it has not already made, nor to
identify anything at all if the agency determines it would be infeasible. This
exemption process makes the NMSR not so much a limitation as a minor
formality in the state rulemaking process.
The Montana exemption process, by contrast, is much more
complicated. It requires written findings that the proposed rule protects
69.
70.
71.
72.

Pa. Exec. Order No. 1996-1(2)(a) (1996).
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
See infra Part III.C.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 341-D(1-B) (West 2002).
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public health or the environment, based on peer-reviewed scientific
evidence in the record, following a public hearing and opportunity for
public comment.73 Furthermore, there must be economic findings on the
cost to the regulated community, and findings that the proposed rule can
mitigate harm to the public health or environment using current
technology.74 This process is not only time-intensive, but potentially
expensive and fraught with opportunity for political forces to derail the
rulemaking. This exemption process makes the NMSR function like a
nonexpansive PPRA—it discourages promulgation of far-reaching
regulations for fear that this complicated exemption process will be
triggered.
In Tennessee, the exemption process requires the state to provide
money to municipalities for any more stringent regulation that it imposes
that requires increased municipal expenditures.75 This exemption
effectively requires the state legislature to fund the rule through an
allocation process, where it is subject to delay and politicization.
Two NMSRs even require executive approval before a rule may go
into effect. In Florida, “[f]inal action shall be by the Governor and Cabinet,
who shall accept, reject, modify, or remand . . . the standard.”76 To some
extent this additional step in the exemption process is moot since
environmental agencies are part of the executive anyway—and thus
presumably the Governor’s office can make its wishes known early in the
process—but this may not always be the case, especially as administrations
change power.77 In any case, executive approval delays implementation,
and opens the rulemaking to an additional level of political scrutiny.
It should be clear that the mere availability of an exemption process
does not completely eliminate the effect of the NMSR. Even in Maine,
where the exemption is easy to earn, the NMSR still imposes an extra step
in the rulemaking process. In Montana, the cost of the exemption process in
terms of time and effort is so high that it might even approach the upper
limit of the political will of the state legislature to override their NMSR in a
select instance. In Tennessee, in which the NMSR requires that money be
allocated in the state budget, any new rule that imposes costs on
municipalities requires legislative acquiescence. Thus, even though the
73. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-203(2)-(3) (2003).
74. Id.
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-226(l) (1999).
76. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.804(2) (West 2004).
77. See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261 (Nov. 14, 2000) (creating a workplace
ergonomics rule under the Clinton administration); Steven Greenhouse, Bush Plan to Avert Work
Injuries Seeks Voluntary Steps by Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A1 (rejecting the workplace
ergonomics rule created under the Clinton administration).
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possibility of an exemption exists, it does not necessarily lower the barrier
to environmental rulemaking.
Finally, even where there are exemption processes, most NMSRs do
not allow blanket exemptions for emergency conditions. This lack of
emergency awareness is an interesting oversight in the NMSRs,
particularly since many PPRAs go to lengths to establish such provisions.78
But this lack of explicit emergency authorization does not necessarily mean
that states are handicapped in an emergency. In the Florida statute, for
instance, proposed regulations go into effect immediately, then are
subsequently subject to a review process by which they may be terminated
6. Limited Applicability
Most NMSRs are generally applicable, meaning that they impact all
state environmental rulemaking in the water quality field. Seventeen rules
are of this type.79 Although some of these seventeen apply to all
environmental rulemaking (including air quality, zoning, and the like), and
others only apply to rulemaking related to water quality protection, these
two groups are considered here as one. This Note considers a state’s rule to
be generally applicable unless it specifically limits itself to a certain aspect
of water quality protection.
The other ten NMSRs limit themselves to a small class of regulation
within the broader context of water quality protection. Six of the ten apply
only to underground storage tank regulation;80 the rest apply exclusively to
narrow classes of regulations, such as those for forestry operations81 or
waste-water treatment plants.82 These laws with limited applicability do not
prohibit regulation except in their small target area. They are not
limitations on a scale even close to that of their generally applicable
cousins. Therefore, as a matter of relative stringency, this Note considers
NMSRs of limited applicability as much less stringent than those of general
applicability, regardless of the other provisions of the rule.
B. Assignment of Stringency Points
After the features were identified, each feature was assigned a
“stringency score” depending on how much it interfered with gap-filling.
The maximum possible stringency score is 100, which is the score if all
78. See infra Part IV.A.10.
79. See infra Table 2.
80. ALA. CODE § 22-35-10 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.365 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 49-1009 (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 459.824 (2000); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1416 (Michie 2003).
81. OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.110(2) (2003).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Michie 2001).
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identified features are present and there is no exemption process. All the
scores are additive except for Limited Applicability, which is a multiplier
of 1/10 for the scores of those NMSRs that are not generally applicable. In
other words, the final score for a limited applicability rule is 10% of what
the score would be for an otherwise identical generally applicable rule. As
a consequence of this multiplier, coupled with the Affects Quantifiable
Limits feature that is present in all NMSRs (and which has a stringency
value greater than ten), it is impossible for a limited applicability NMSR
ever to be more stringent than a general applicability rule under this scoring
scheme. This condition is intended to ensure that the limited applicability
statutes, which are generally quite stringent but narrowly focused, do not
overweight the index.
Table 1 on the following page shows the breakdown of points, and
explains how the 100 possible points were divided among the features.
Reasonable minds could obviously differ over the assignment of stringency
points, but every effort was made to assign the points in such a way that the
score reflected a feature’s relative ability to interfere with state gap-filling
as discussed in Part IV.A. Throughout the process, limited sensitivity tests
were run on the scores to ensure that no score exerted excessive weight on
the state rankings, unless the score was merited (such as the ones for
Limited Applicability and No Exemptions).
Where there is an exemption process, the stringency increases with
each additional action that is required to earn an exemption. The actions
have been broken down into parts that reflect each of the most common
exemption process requirements. Where the exemption process requires
some unique action—such as the Montana requirement for evidence from
peer-reviewed scientific studies—the Other category is used. The At Least
Environment category is for when a NMSR allows an exemption for either
findings of an impact on the environment or some other relevant findings.
In this case, the assigned score was the same as the score for environmental
impact findings alone, because it is the lowest of the findings scores. Even
if all findings, public hearings, and approval are required, the stringency of
the exemption process is still slightly less than having no exemption
process at all.
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Table 1: No More Stringent Rules Scoring
Provision

Description

Score

Affects
Quantifiable
Limits

State limits may not be
more stringent than federal
limits, regardless of whether
there is federal jurisdiction.

12

Jurisdictional
Ties to Federal
Regulations

State may only assert
jurisdiction if the federal
government could also
assert jurisdiction.

30

Federal
Silence
Preempts

Federal silence means that
the state may not regulate
areas for which no federal
rules exist.

8

Justification
This is the identity
test for inclusion in
the NMSR list.
Therefore, all statutes
have this feature. The
reason it is included
at all is because of
the multiplier for
General
Applicability, which
is only meaningful if
there is a base set of
points.
This is one of the
most stringent
conditions possible,
because it implies
that the state may
never regulate any
item that could not
also be regulated by
the federal
government, thereby
subjecting the state to
the U.S. Commerce
Clause and other
limitations on
Congressional power.
This condition means
that the ambit of state
regulations is
determined by the
federal government.
Nonetheless, this is
not as stringent as a
restriction on
jurisdiction because
the state may
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Retroactive

The restriction applies to
state regulations thenexisting at the time when
the federal rule was
changed, potentially
invalidating existing state
rules.

20

No
Exemptions
Allowed

No exemption procedure is
available.

30

***OR***

127

establish its own
jurisdictional limits;
the state is just
prevented from
creating new classes
of regulation. The
score is relatively low
in part because of the
uncertainty involved
with including states
in this category.
Retrospective
provisions are
stringent because
they may destroy
existing state rules.
For this reason there
is a meaningful
penalty associated
with them. However,
over the long term,
the retrospective
application will be
overshadowed by the
ongoing restrictions
discussed above.
If no exemptions are
allowed, the
stringency
requirement is
absolute regardless of
environmental
consequences. Since
no exemptions are
allowed, the score of
this provision is
greater than the sum
of all the possible
exemption
requirements listed.
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Exemption if…
Findings as to…

Economic
Impact

To overcome the restriction,
there must be a finding that
economic harm would be
incurred.

6

Health Impact

To overcome the restriction,
there must be finding that
human health would be
harmed.

6

Environmental
Impact

To overcome the restriction,
there must be a finding that
the environment would
suffer adverse impact.

2

Other

Additional, state-by-state
showings are required to
overcome the restriction.

2

At Least
Environmental

There are multiple findings
that may satisfy the
exemption process, but at
the very least environmental

2

Economic findings
are hard to make,
because they require
costly and timeconsuming analyses,
and because there is
often considerable
uncertainty about the
data and results.
Health impacts are
also difficult to make,
because small
impacts are difficult
to quantify, and
epidemiological
experiments are timeconsuming.
Environmental
impacts are easier to
observe, especially
where a natural
resource is being
immediately touched
by the regulation.
Some states require
additional findings,
although these tend to
be relatively
straightforward
determinations of
“necessity” that
presumably may be
prepared more easily
than an impact
analysis.
This feature receives
the same score as
environmental impact
findings alone.
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findings are sufficient.

Public Hearing

A public hearing must be
held prior to any exemption
decision, including a
process for public comment.

8

Approval

Legislative executive
approval is required before
an exemption may be
granted.

5

Limited
Applicability

The stringency requirement
applies only to select types
of water quality regulation.

x0.1

Public hearings are
time-consuming,
regardless of whether
they involve
opportunity for oral
or written comments.
They are also timeconsuming in that the
hearing implies an
additional period of
reflection to
determine whether
the agency action is
appropriate in light of
new information.
Legislative or
executive approval is
subject to political
forces, and may lead
to results that are
more consistent with
special interests than
regulatory prudence.
This category is
included to give a
break to states whose
no more stringent
rules only apply to a
select field of
regulation. If the
statute is of limited
applicability, the
entire score is
multiplied by 1/10.
Otherwise, the score
stands (i.e. no
discount).

Minimum Score = 0 (least stringent)
Maximum Score = 100 (most stringent)
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C. Categorization by State
All twenty-seven rules were analyzed according to whether the
features described above were present or absent in the NMSR. In most
cases, this was a straightforward process. In others, a limited amount of
interpretive freedom was utilized in determining the intent of the NMSR.
As a rule, though, where an NMSR was not clear one way or the other (for
example, the Colorado statute in relation to federal silence83), the NMSR
was not included in a category. Thus, the categorizations err on the side of
under-inclusion, and therefore may underestimate actual stringency. That
said, where a decent argument could be made for listing, the state was
included in a category.
To minimize the inevitable influence from personal interpretation, a
simple sensitivity analysis was used to calibrate the scoring in a back-andforth process to ensure that the rankings of the states did not change
significantly depending on a few stringency points allocated between one
feature or another.
Table 2 shows the breakdown by state of the features identified, along
with each state’s final stringency score. All scores have been rounded to the
nearest integer.
Based on the stringency scores, Map 1 shows a map of the United
States shaded by stringency. The scores are grouped in bins of ten points,
which loses some precision, but does further account for the scoring
uncertainty.

83. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Arkansas

Colorado

•

•

•

•

•

30
8

•

•

•

20

No Exemptions
Allowed
Exemption if…
Findings as to…
Economic
Impact
Health Impact
Environmental
Impact
Other
At Least
Environmental
Public Hearing
Approval
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

Arizona

Pts
12

Alaska

Category
Affects Limits
Jurisdictional
Ties
Federal Silence
Preempts
Retroactive

Alabama

Table 2: No More Stringent Rules by State

30

•

•

•

6
6
2
•

2
2

•

8
5

•

x0.1

•

•

•

•

5

4

5

2

22
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Maine

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

30
8

•

•

•

20

No Exemptions
Allowed
Exemption if…
Findings as to…
Economic
Impact
Health Impact
Environmental
Impact
Other
At Least
Environmental
Public Hearing
Approval
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

Kentucky

Pts
12

Iowa

Category
Affects Limits
Jurisdictional
Ties
Federal Silence
Preempts
Retroactive
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Idaho

OBSTACLES TO DEVOLUTION

Florida

Fall 2004]

•

30

6

•

•

•

6
2

•
•

2
2
8
5

•

x0.1
33

80

72

80

14
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Nevada

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

30

•

8
20

No Exemptions
Allowed
Exemption if…
Findings as to…
Economic
Impact
Health Impact
Environmental
Impact
Other
At Least
Environmental
Public Hearing
Approval
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

Nebraska

Pts
12

Montana

Category
Affects Limits
Jurisdictional
Ties
Federal Silence
Preempts
Retroactive
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Mississippi

OBSTACLES TO DEVOLUTION

Maryland

Fall 2004]

•

30

•

•

•

•

4

5

6
6
2
•

2
2

•

•
•

8
5

x0.1
14

72

54
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•
•

Pennsylvania

•
•

•

•

•

8

•

20

No Exemptions
30
Allowed
Exemption if…
Findings as to…
Economic
6
Impact
Health Impact
6
Environmental
2
Impact
Other
2
At Least
2
Environmental
Public Hearing
8
Approval
5
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

•

Oregon

Pts
12
30

Oklahoma

Category
Affects Limits
Jurisdictional Ties
Federal Silence
Preempts
Retroactive
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Ohio
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North Dakota
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•

•
•
•

•
•

•

•

•

x0.1
28

44

50

5

34
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No Exemptions
Allowed
Exemption if…
Findings as to…
Economic
Impact
Health Impact
Environmental
Impact
Other
At Least
Environmental
Public Hearing
Approval
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

Utah

Virginia

West Virginia

Category
Affects Limits
Jurisdictional
Ties
Federal Silence
Preempts
Retroactive
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Tennessee
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South Dakota

Fall 2004]

Pts
12

•

•

•

•

•

30

•

•

8

•

20

•

30

•
•

•

•

6
6

•

2

•

2
•

2
8
5

•

x0.1

•
72

5

•

•
58

5

44
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Category
Affects Limits
Jurisdictional Ties
Federal Silence
Preempts
Retroactive
No Exemptions
Allowed

Pts
12
30
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Wyoming
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Wisconsin

Fall 2004]

•
•

•
•

8
20

•

30

Exemption if…
Findings as to…
Economic Impact
Health Impact
Environmental
Impact
Other
At Least
Environmental
Public Hearing
Approval
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

6
6

•

2

•

2
2
8
5
•

x0.1
50

5
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IV. TAXONOMY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS ACTS
State private property rights acts protect the rights of owners to
exercise the free enjoyment of their property without the burden of
government regulation.84 In the field of water quality regulation, dealing
inherently with the interaction of real property and the biosphere, almost
any regulation is going to interfere in some way with private property
rights. But as Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon, “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law.”85 The PPRAs, therefore, must balance this necessity for
some legitimate regulation against the possibility of the government
interfering excessively with an owner’s use and enjoyment of their
property.
For this reason, only a minority of the PPRAs actually expand
property rights and create a cause of action against the state for deprivation
under the state constitution when that same claim would be invalid under
84. Ann L. Renhard Cole, Note, State Private Property Rights Acts: The Potential for Implicating
Federal Environmental Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 685, 685 (1998).
85. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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the United States Constitution.86 The rest of the PPRAs limit themselves to
assessment procedures.87 These nonexpansive statutes require the state to
analyze the potential for a takings claim prior to regulation. They do not
create any new cause of action; they merely slow down and discourage the
environmental regulatory process.
Twenty PPRAs are surveyed here.88 Seventeen of these are of general
applicability, meaning that they apply to all forms of environmental
regulation.89 Only three apply to limited circumstances,90 but importantly,
these three are all expansive PPRAs. Only two generally applicable PPRAs
expand private property rights to create new causes of action.91
As with the NMSRs, the most difficult part of creating the taxonomy
for PPRAs was identifying the proper level of generality for each of the
features, but the relative uniformity of language in PPRAs facilitated this
process. Two features—“Affects Legislature” and “Paid Repeals”— are so
unusual (and potentially stringent) that they merited creation of special
categories. Again, the names of a few categories sound contorted. This
contortion was necessary for the same reason: the features are named in
such a way that their inclusion in a PPRA indicates an increased level of
stringency.92
While continuing to highlight the distinction between compensation
and assessment, this Note prefers the terms “expansive” and
“nonexpansive” for three reasons. First, calling a PPRA a “compensation”
statute may give the misleading impression that compensation is required
for any regulatory action that impinges on private property rights. This is
86. See infra Part IV.A.2.
87. See infra Part IV.A.2.
88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 11-810 to -811 & 41-1311 to -1313 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 605 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-8001 to -8004 (Michie
1997); IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-701 to -707 (1994); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3608-3612, 3623 (West 2001) (agriculture & forestry lands); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 8056 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 24.421-425 (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1
to -17 (2003) (agriculture & forestry lands); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 536.017-.018 (2001); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 75-1-102 to -201 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(e) (2002) (shellfisheries); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-1-201 to -204 (1999); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045 (Vernon 2000); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to -4 & 63-90a-1 to -4 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4007 (Michie 2000);
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 22-1A-1 to -6 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 95-301 to -305 (Michie 2003).
89. See supra note 43.
90. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3608-3612, 3623 (West 2003) (agriculture & forestry lands); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -17 (2003) (agriculture & forestry lands); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(e)
(West 2000) (shellfisheries).
91. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001 (West 2004); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045 (Vernon
2000).
92. With the exception of Limited Applicability, which is a multiplier that reduces the overall
score. See infra Part IV.B.
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not in fact the case. Second, the assessment statues rarely use the word
“assessment,” but more typically use “expansion” terminology in language
like “[i]t is not the purpose of this [law] to expand or reduce the scope of
private
property
protections.”93
Third,
the
use
of
the
expansive/nonexpansive dichotomy accurately describes the set of
PPRAs—all fall in one of the two categories.
A. Distinct Features of Private Property Rights Acts
1. Nonexpansive
Nonexpansive PPRAs do not create new property rights or expand
existing ones, they merely call for an assessment of takings implications
prior to agency action. Thus, they do not create an increased chance that the
state will be forced to pay large compensation awards as a result of
environmental regulation, but they do subject the process of creating
regulation to additional procedures that lay bare the ways in which the
regulation will interfere with private property. This process leads to
heightened scrutiny from the public, exposure to political pressure, and the
possibility of politically embarrassing confrontations with private property
rights advocates. Consequently, an agency seeking to avoid unwelcome
scrutiny or confrontation should tend to scale back potentially far-reaching
regulations to make the assessment process more politically palatable.94 For
this reason, nonexpansive PPRAs are not so much an obstacle to gap-filling
as a deterrent.
The language in the Idaho statute is typical of many nonexpansive
PPRAs: “The purpose of this [law] is to establish an orderly, consistent
review process that better enables state agencies and local governments to
evaluate whether proposed regulatory or administrative actions may result
in a taking of private property without due process of law.”95 This language
does not suggest any intention to curtail regulatory activity, but rather it
purports to protect the due process rights of property owners. While
seemingly innocuous on its face, one must remember that the property
owner would not be denied due process in any event; this statute merely
shifts the burden of assuring due process to the state agency, which is more
easily subjected to political pressure than the courts.

93. IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).
94. Eagle, supra note 36, at 121 (arguing nonetheless that agencies are unlikely to “zealously
police themselves”).
95. IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 (Michie 1997).
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2. Expansive
The expansive PPRAs establish new property rights at the state level.
Whereas the nonexpansive PPRAs are deterrents to regulation, the
expansive PPRAs are outright obstacles. By establishing broader property
rights, the expansive PPRAs lower the threshold for what constitutes a
regulatory taking.96 Although the federal government could continue to
regulate without causing a taking under the Fifth Amendment, a state
agency promulgating an identical regulation might cause a taking under the
expanded state definition of property if that regulation impinges on these
new property rights. It is for this reason that expansive PPRAs are
particularly effective at curtailing gap-filling. That said, there are only two
expansive PPRAs of general applicability.97 Finally, it should be noted that
expansive statutes may also call for assessment, but since this requirement
has much less impact than the compensation threat, the statutes are
categorized as Expansive.98
Perhaps the most well-known of all the PPRAs, the Harris Act in
Florida “creates a new cause of action to provide compensation to a
landowner when the actions of a government entity impose an ‘inordinate
burden’ on the owner’s real property.”99 The inordinate burden standard is
new to the field of takings. There are two ways that a regulation may
impose an inordinate burden: (1) by causing a permanent loss of the
[landowner’s] reasonable, investment-backed expectations, or (2) by
leaving the landowner with a use that is unreasonable and forces the
landowner to bear a greater burden than borne by the public at large.100
This standard is much lower than the Fifth Amendment takings standard,101
and therefore is said to create expanded rights and a new cause of action.
96. This can occur by either lowering the property value diminution needed, e.g. TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. §2007.001-.045 (Vernon 2000), or by lowering the standard of proof, e.g. FLA. STAT. CH.
70.001 (West 2004).
97. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001 (West 2004); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045 (Vernon
2000).
98. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3609 (West 2001) (requiring that a “government entity shall
prepare a written assessment of any proposed governmental action prior to taking any proposed action
that will likely result in a diminution in value of private agricultural property”).
99. David L. Powell et al., A Measured Step to Protect Private Property Rights, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 255, 265 (1995).
100. Id. at 273-274; see also, Jane Cameron Hayman & Nancy Stuparich, Private Property Rights:
Regulating the Regulators, 70 FLA. BAR J. 55, 56 (1996) (stating that temporary impacts are not
inordinate burdens, nor are actions to abate a nuisance).
101. Stemming a long line of cases following from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (‘‘The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So too, is the character of the governmental action.
A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
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The Texas act takes a different approach that is much more precise in
the way that it creates the expanded property rights. It declares that, by
definition, a taking is a government action that “is the producing cause of a
reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected private
real property.”102 It is easy to imagine an environmental regulation that in
some instances causes a diminution in value of twenty-five percent or
more. For example, a general regulation protecting wetlands might result in
the denial of a construction permit to build a commercial shopping center,
dramatically reducing the development value of the land. Even if only a
small percentage of properties touched by a regulation have a diminution of
value that exceeds the twenty-five percent threshold, the burden on the
fiscal purse could be significant. This rule effectively prevents state
agencies from promulgating serious environmental regulations.
3. Affects Executive Agencies
All the PPRAs surveyed in this paper apply to executive agencies.
This category is in effect a threshold requirement for inclusion as a PPRA,
like the Affects Quantifiable Limits category for NMSRs.103 The reason
that PPRAs apply to executive agencies is that they are the ones that may
promulgate environmental rules without direct legislative oversight.
Although always subject to legislative override, the purpose of PPRAs is to
move the assurance of due process to an earlier point in the regulatory
process, which is why it makes sense to target the rulemakers and not
simply wait for legislative disapproval.
4. Affects Local Governments and Municipalities
Some PPRAs go a step further and include local governments and
municipalities within their purview. This paper views application to local
governments as a measure of increased severity, because such an
application imposes additional assessment or compensation costs on local
governments that are less likely than the state to have the budget to pay for
them. Furthermore, local zoning regulations may be an effective way to
mitigate environmental harm to especially sensitive areas, but even these
zoning regulations become subject to the PPRA if it applies to local
governments. Ironically, one of the arguments for devolution is that
targeted local regulations are more efficient than “one-size-fits-all” national
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.’’ (citations omitted)).
102. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (Vernon 2000).
103. And it is included for the same reason: to establish a baseline set of points so that in
combination with the Limited Applicability multiplier it yields a meaningful distinction between
generally applicable PPRAs and limited applicability PPRAs.
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rules,104 but PPRAs that apply to local governments might in fact
discourage this sort of targeted regulation.
5. Affects Legislative Branch
The Mississippi PPRA is particularly noteworthy because not even
direct legislative action escapes its compensation requirements. Although
the effect is somewhat mitigated by the fact that it only applies to forest
and agricultural lands, this PPRA is so far-reaching that it discourages
environmental regulation from “the State of Mississippi, any county,
municipality or any political subdivision thereof.”105 While it might seem
strange that the legislature would bind its own hands—especially since the
same legislature could presumably vote itself exceptions—this kind of rule
is not entirely unheard of. For example, the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995106 forces the U.S. Congress to go through an assessment
process prior to creating federal mandates.
6. Applies to Exactions
An exaction is a conditioned demand by a state agency that a real
property owner convey certain property rights in return for a permit or
other desired benefit.107 For example, in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 108 the Coastal Commission conditioned the approval of a
construction permit on the grant of an easement for public beachfront
access. There is little practical difference between taking the easement
directly (which would clearly require compensation) and demanding this
relinquishment of property rights as part of an exaction. While exactions
continue to be covered by U.S. Fifth Amendment takings law as applied
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the PPRAs that apply to exactions
force a state agency to consider the takings consequences up front, well
before the controversy reaches a court.
Many of the PPRAs that apply to exactions are also expansive
statutes. This correlation makes sense, because exactions by definition
reduce the property rights of the landowner. For example, the Texas PPRA
applies to any government action that “requires a dedication or exaction of
private real property.”109
104. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
105. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(j) (2003).
106. 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000).
107. Alan Romero, Two Constitutional Theories for Invalidating Extortionate Exactions, 78 NEB.
L. REV. 348, 348 n.1 (1999) (defining an exaction as “a condition of development permission that
requires a public facility or improvement to be provided at the developer’s expense”).
108. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
109. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.003(a)(2) (Vernon 2000).
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Some nonexpansive statutes also apply to exactions. Consider the
Michigan PPRA, which among other things applies to “[a] decision on an
application for a permit or license . . . [and] required dedications or
exactions of private property.”110 This application to exactions makes the
statute quite onerous, because it requires a takings review for basically any
land use decision. It is this potential for costly and numerous as-applied
challenges that makes application to exactions a particularly stringent
feature of a PPRA.
7. Applies to Final Rules
The majority of PPRAs apply to final rules,111 which are rules that
have passed through the negotiated rulemaking process and are ready for
implementation and enforcement. For nonexpansive statutes, application at
this phase means that the takings assessment is basically a final step prior
to implementation. For compensation statutes, application at this phase
creates the immediate possibility of takings claims, although constitutional
questions of ripeness may remain.112 Nonetheless, the intention of applying
to final rules is to force the takings issue as soon as possible after the
political wrangling over the rule has subsided.
PPRAs do not state explicitly that they apply to final rules, but the
intent can be inferred from other language. For example, the Michigan
PPRA applies to the “enforcement of a statute or rule,”113 which can only
occur once a rule has been finalized. Perhaps needless to say, the PPRA
does not apply to a “formal exercise of the power of eminent domain”114—
the state can always avoid the assessment process as long as it is willing to
compensate the landowner up front.
8. Applies to Proposed Rules
PPRAs that do not apply to final rules instead apply to proposed rules,
and sometimes they apply to both.115 To some extent, the difference
between a proposed rule and a final rule is insignificant—the proposed rule
is merely at an earlier stage in its development. But when a PPRA applies
to proposed rules, it creates an incentive for the regulated community to
challenge rules at an initial stage, discouraging the agency from
promulgating any rule that it cannot be certain will not cause a regulatory

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.422(c) (West 2001).
See infra Table 4.
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.422(c)(iv) (West 2001).
Id. § 24.422(d)(i).
See infra Table 4.
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taking.116 This focus on takings at an early stage implies that there will be
less thinking about environmental benefits and more thinking about
property rights consequences, likely leading to fewer environmental
benefits.
PPRAs that apply to proposed rules are generally quite clear in their
intent. For instance, the Wyoming language is typical: The PPRA applies to
“[p]roposed rules by a state agency that if adopted and enforced may limit
the use of private property.”117 Once again—a small consolation to the state
agency—a formal exercise of eminent domain avoids the requirements of
the statute.118
9. Outside Review
One important question is who performs the takings analysis. Is it
performed by the agency that promulgates the rule; or by another
government agency; or by a nonexecutive party? The answer to this
question plays a major role in determining how much political pressure can
be brought to bear on the rulemaking process. Presumably, a review by an
outside agent, or a different branch of the government, will tend to
discourage far-reaching rules, because more diverse interests will have a
veto power over the rule.
In a few states, the review is completely internal. For example, the
Missouri law dictates that “[n]o department or agency shall transmit a
proposed rule or regulation which limits or affects the use of real
property . . . until a takings analysis has occurred,”119 but gives no guidance
as to the actual analytical procedure, leaving the promulgating agency free
to interpret how rigorous an analysis is demanded. This completely internal
review exposes the rulemaking process to less politicization, so it is
considered to be less severe than outside review.
The most common process is a mix of inside and outside review,
where the attorney general’s office writes and maintains a “checklist” that
can be used internally by the promulgating agency to identify rules that
have the potential to cause regulatory takings. For example, in Idaho “[t]he
attorney general shall establish . . . a checklist[] that better enables a state
agency . . . to evaluate proposed regulatory or administrative actions to
assure that such actions do not result in an unconstitutional taking of
private property. . . . All state agencies . . . shall follow the guidelines of the

116.
117.
118.
119.

E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-5-302(a)(iii)(A)(I) (Michie 2003).
Id.
Id. § 9-5-302(a)(iii)(B)(I).
MO. REV. STAT. § 536.017 (2001).
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attorney general.”120 For purposes of this Note, this form of review is
considered internal, even though the checklist is created by an office
outside the promulgating agency.
The Maine rule, by contrast, requires the agency to “[s]ubmit the rule
to the Attorney General for approval as to form and legality,”121 upon
which “[t]he Attorney General may not approve a rule if it is reasonably
expected to result in a taking of private property.”122 Since there is no clear
line as to what may “reasonably be expected to constitute a taking,” this
PPRA gives a veto power over the regulation to an outside reviewer,
exposing the process to politicization, and discouraging the promulgating
agency from stepping too close to the takings line. This is not to say that
the attorney general’s office is inherently opposed to environmental
rulemaking, only that rulemaking (and therefore gap-filling) becomes more
difficult when there are more parties that must be satisfied.
Arizona’s process is unique: The law creates an “advocate office” that
represents “the interests of private property owners in proceedings
involving governmental action.”123 The advocate is appointed by the
legislative council, giving the legislative branch an extra level of influence
over the executive branch. While this sort of legislative veto is arguably
impermissible at the federal level,124 this is a further example of how states
can impose rules on themselves that may create unforeseen hurdles in the
devolutionary process.
Finally, states vary with whether the outside review is covered by
attorney-client privilege. While the issue of privilege could merit a
category to itself—since privileged review potentially frees regulators to
make far-reaching decisions even when deemed questionable by the
reviewers—it is too hard to tell whether some reviews would be
confidential under state ethics or other rules, regardless of the silence of the
PPRA on this matter. For the record, the three PPRAs that clearly privilege
the review are Idaho,125 Indiana,126 and Washington.127

120. IDAHO CODE § 67-8003(1) (Michie 1997).
121. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8056(1)(A) (West 2002); see also id. § 8056(6) (specifying
further that “the review . . . may not be performed by any person involved in the formulation or drafting
of the proposed rule”).
122. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8056(6) (West 2002) (allowing a few exceptions).
123. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1312(A) (West 2000).
124. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
125. IDAHO CODE § 67-8003(2) (Michie 1997).
126. IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32(f) (Michie 1998).
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(4) (2002).
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10. No Emergency Exceptions
A number of states go out of their way to exclude rules promulgated
on an emergency basis from review under the PPRA.128 For example, one
can imagine the urgent need to deny a construction permit on a wetland that
is serving a major flood control purpose for which no alternative control
technology is in place. Statutes that deny exceptions for emergency
conditions are more stringent than others because they force the route of
condemnation in a true emergency where there is no time to wait for
assessment or outside review.
Of the statutes that create specific emergency exemptions, Kansas is
typical: “If there is an immediate threat to public health, safety or welfare
that constitutes an emergency requiring immediate action to eliminate the
risk, the report required by this section shall be prepared when the
emergency action is completed, in which case the report shall include a
complete description of the facts relied upon by the agency in declaring the
need for emergency action.”129 Where a statute is silent on the issue of
emergency exceptions, this Note assumes there are none.
11. Fee-Shifting
One of the most powerful features of some PPRAs is a provision
allowing for the reimbursement of costs and attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff
in the event the state action has indeed caused a regulatory taking. These
provisions generally encourage litigation and administrative challenges,
because they create an incentive for attorneys to take cases that might
otherwise not be remunerative on a contingency fee basis.130 State agencies,
under threat of paying fees and costs, will be seriously discouraged from
promulgating any rule that might push the line of what is considered a
regulatory taking. This category includes both those PPRAs where fees
must be paid, as well as those where fees may be paid. The reason is that
both have the same incentive—even if different in degree—to encourage
legal challenges, especially on otherwise small cases.
The West Virginia statute requires payment of reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs if either “the court determines that the division failed to
perform the assessment required [by the PPRA]; or [i]f the court
determines that the division . . . failed to conclude that its action was
reasonably likely to require compensation to be paid.”131 Here, the penalty
128. See infra Table 4.
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-706(6)(b) (1994).
130. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 687 (1983) (citing legislative history of the
Clean Air Act stating that fee-shifting provisions are intended to “encourage litigation which will assure
proper implementation and administration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest”).
131. W. VA. CODE § 22-1A-5 (2003).
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for an erroneous conclusion as to the takings assessment can result in major
additional costs to the state agency, above the costs of the inverse
condemnation. This rule acutely discourages far-reaching environmental
rules for fear of the serious consequences of overstepping the line. The
Texas PPRA is even more direct: “The court or state agency shall award a
private real property owner who prevails . . . reasonable and necessary
attorney’s fees and court costs.”132
The Florida statute, by contrast, leaves significantly more discretion to
the court. Attorneys’ fees are only awarded where the property owner
prevails and the government did not make a bona fide settlement offer. As
a measure of symmetry the government can recover its own attorneys’ fees
if it prevails and the property owner had earlier failed to accept a
reasonable settlement offer.133
12. Paid Repeals
One unusual provision in the Mississippi statute merits a category of
its own.134 In the event that the state repeals a rule before a decision
becomes final (in other words, before the taking occurs), the owner may
recover its “damages arising out of the action before the repeal, and, in the
discretion of the court, its costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees).”135 It is easy to imagine what damages there are
before the taking occurs, for instance, real property taxes, planning costs,
and interest expenses associated with development delay.
13. Limited Applicability
The majority of PPRAs are considered generally applicable, meaning
that they apply to any environmental regulatory decision that impacts
private property rights. Seventeen PPRAs are of this type.136 Because of
their broad reach, these generally applicable statutes have much more
potential to interfere with gap-filling than limited applicability statutes,
which only apply in narrow circumstances.
There are three limited applicability PPRAs: In both Louisiana137 and
Mississippi,138 the PPRA is applicable only to regulations of forestry or
agricultural activity; In North Carolina, the law is applicable only to
132. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.026(a) (Vernon 2000) (emphasis added).
133. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001(6)(c)(1)&(2) (West 2004); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
2007.026(b) (Vernon 2000) (similar provision).
134. Although it only applies to forest and agricultural lands.
135. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-9(2) (2003).
136. See infra Table 4.
137. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3608-3612, 3623 (West 2001).
138. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -17 (2003).
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property interests in shellfisheries in state waters.139 Although it is likely
that the Mississippi and Louisiana statutes will have broader gap-filling
implications than the North Carolina statute, none of the three is considered
generally applicable for the purposes of this Note. While the disparate
impact is recognized, this Note draws a clear line between those statutes
that restrict their applicability and those that do not. All limited
applicability PPRAs are considered significantly less stringent than
otherwise identical generally applicable statutes.
B. Assignment of Stringency Points
As with the NMSRs, after the features were identified each feature
was assigned a “stringency score” depending on how much it added to the
statute’s severity in discouraging regulatory gap-filling. The maximum
possible stringency score is 100, which is the score if the PPRA is
expansive and all the other features are present. Again, all the scores are
additive except for Limited Applicability, which is a multiplier or 1/10 for
PPRAs that are not of general applicability. As a consequence of this
multiplier, coupled with the either Expansive or Nonexpansive feature and
the Affects Executive Bodies feature that is present in all PPRAs—together
they have a stringency value greater than ten—it is impossible for a limited
applicability PPRA ever to be more stringent than a general applicability
rule under this scoring scheme.
Table 3 on the following page shows the breakdown of points, and
explains how the 100 possible points were divided among the features. The
same caveat applies here as with the NMSRs: Reasonable minds could
obviously differ over the assignment of stringency points, but every effort
was made to assign the points in such a way that the score reflects a
feature’s relative ability to interfere with state gap-filling. Throughout the
process, limited sensitivity tests were run on the scores to ensure that no
score exerted excessive weight on the state rankings, unless the score was
merited (such as the ones for Limited Applicability and Expansive).
Except for the Expansive/Nonexpansive distinction, none of the other
categories are mutually exclusive. That said, it was rare that a PPRA would
apply to both final rules and proposed rules, although in two instances this
was the case. Consequently, these categories remain additive, even though
the marginal stringency of one on top of the other is perhaps less than
either of the two measured independently.
Table 3: Private Property Rights Acts Scoring
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(e) (2000).
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Provision
Nonexpansive
(Assessment)

Description
This act does not create a
right of action against
the government, it
merely requires the
government to perform a
takings assessment prior
to action.

Score
10

Expansive
(Compensation)

The act expands the
private property rights of
state residents and
creates a cause of action
requiring compensation
for diminution in value.

30

Affects
Executive
Bodies

The act only applies to
actions of the executive,
including state
administrative agencies
The act also applies to
the legislative action of
local governments,
including cities, counties
or municipalities

5

Affects Local
Governments

Affects State
Legislature

The act is binding on the
state legislature itself.

6

10
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Justification
While an assessmentonly act seems
innocuous, the fact that
the act is on the books
discourages
environmental regulation,
earning this provision a
small penalty.
By expanding private
property rights of state
residents, the state makes
some state regulations
require compensation
even though the same
regulations, were they
promulgated by the
federal government,
would not.
Identity test. Executive
agencies are the default
targets of all private
property rights acts.
An act that also applies to
local governments is
significantly more
restrictive, because it
discourages gap-filling at
a local level, even where
there is political will and
money.
In the absence of a
repeal, the state
legislature may not even
pass laws that regulate
private property without
scrutiny. This is a potent
restriction because it
significantly discourages
environmental regulation.
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Applies to
Exactions

The act applies to
exactions, and therefore
determinations may be
challenged on an asapplied basis.

8

Applies to Final
Rules

The act allows
challenges to final
agency rules, regardless
of whether they have
been applied.

5

Applies to
Proposed Rules

The act allows
challenges to proposed
agency rules that have
not yet gone into effect.

6

Outside Review

The review of whether
an agency action will
cause a taking is
performed in whole or in
part by a reviewer
outside the promulgating
agency, usually the
attorney general.
The act makes no
provision for emergency
regulation that may
interfere with private
property rights.

7

No Emergency
Exceptions

3
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By applying to exactions,
every aggrieved property
owner may challenge the
agency action, resulting
in considerable expense
and uneven enforcement.
By allowing challenges
to final rules, the agency
is discouraged from
promulgating farreaching regulations for
fear that they will be
struck down before they
are ever applied.
This is an even more
aggressive way of
discouraging agency
action, because the
agency can be challenged
before their rules are
finalized, in effect
creating a threat for even
considering regulation
that might affect private
property.
The use of outside review
exposes the process to
politicization, and
discourages the
promulgation of farreaching regulations.

A small penalty is given
for providing no
emergency exception,
because it means a
private landowner could
potentially block critical
stop-gap regulation while
a compensation claim
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was being assessed.
Successful challenges to
12
Fee-shifting provisions
the act require that the
create incentives for
promulgating body pay
aggrieved parties to
the attorneys’ fees of the
challenge a regulation,
challenger.
because their attorneys’
fees may be paid by the
government if the
challenge is successful.
Likewise, they encourage
challenges of small
claims that might
otherwise be too small
for an attorney to take.
The act requires the
8
This is another
promulgating agency to
aggressive means of
pay the costs of a
encouraging challenges
challenge even where it
to regulation, because the
repeals the act prior to a
promulgating agency
final takings
cannot escape paying
determination.
compensation for the
temporary imposition
even by repealing the act.
The act applies only to
x0.1
This category, in effect,
select types of private
dramatically lowers the
property regulation.
stringency of acts that
require review of only
select regulations. If the
statute only applies in
limited circumstances,
the entire score is
multiplied by 1/10.
Minimum Score = 0 (least discouraging)
Maximum Score = 100 (most discouraging)

C. Categorization by State
The same state-by-state categorization process was repeated with the
PPRAs. All twenty statutes were analyzed according to whether the
features described above were present or absent in the statute. For the most
part, this process was much more straightforward for the PPRAs than it was
for the NMSRs. The PPRAs tend to be more explicit in their intentions, and
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the categories used in this paper are more closely tied to language in the
statutes. Once again, though, where a PPRA was not clear one way or the
other, the PPRA was not included in a category. Thus, the categorizations
err on the side of under-inclusion, and therefore may underestimate actual
stringency. As before, where a decent argument could be made for listing,
the state was included in a category.
Again, to minimize the inevitable influence from interpretive bias, a
simple sensitivity analysis was used to test the scoring in an iterative
process to ensure that the rankings of the states did not change significantly
depending on a few stringency points allocated between one feature or
another.
Table 4 shows the breakdown by state of the features identified, along
with each state’s final stringency score. All scores have been rounded to the
nearest integer.
Based on the PPRA stringency scores, Map 2 shows a map of the
United States shaded by stringency. The scores are grouped in bins of ten
points.
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Applies to
Exactions
Applies to Final
Rules
Applies to
Proposed Rules
Outside Review
No Emergency
Exceptions
Fee-Shifting
Paid Repeals
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

Indiana

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Florida

•

Idaho

Affects
Executive
Bodies
Affects Local
Governments
Affects State
Legislature

Delaware

Category
Nonexpansive
(Assessment)
Expansive
(Compensation)

Arizona

Table 4

Pts
10

•

30

5

•

•

6

•

•

•

•

10

8

•

5

•

6

•

7

•

•

•

3

•

•

•

12
8

•

•
•

•

•

30

23

•

x0.1
57

30

76
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Affects
Executive
Bodies
Affects Local
Governments
Affects State
Legislature
Applies to
Exactions
Applies to Final
Rules
Applies to
Proposed Rules
Outside Review
No Emergency
Exceptions
Fee-Shifting
Paid Repeals
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

•

•

Mississippi

Michigan
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Maine

Category
Nonexpansive
(Assessment)
Expansive
(Compensation)

Louisiana
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Kansas
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Pts
10

•
•

30

5

•

•

•

•

•

•

6

•
•

10

8

•

5

•

6

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

7

•

3

•
•
•

12
8
•

x0.1
21

5

•
30

34

8
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Affects
Executive
Bodies
Affects Local
Governments
Affects State
Legislature
Applies to
Exactions
Applies to Final
Rules
Applies to
Proposed Rules
Outside Review
No Emergency
Exceptions
Fee-Shifting
Paid Repeals
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

Texas

•

Tennessee

•
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North
Carolina

Montana

Category
Nonexpansive
(Assessment)
Expansive
(Compensation)

OBSTACLES TO DEVOLUTION
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Pts
10

•

30

5

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

6
10
•

8

•

5
6

•

•

•

•
•

•
•

7
•

3

•
•

12
8
•

x0.1
21

32

4

36

66
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Applies to
Exactions
Applies to Final
Rules
Applies to
Proposed Rules
Outside Review
No Emergency
Exceptions
Fee-Shifting
Paid Repeals
Limited
Applicability
STRINGENCY

Washington

West
Virginia

Wyoming

Affects
Executive
Bodies
Affects Local
Governments
Affects State
Legislature
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Virginia

Category
Nonexpansive
(Assessment)
Expansive
(Compensation)
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•

•

•

•

•

5

•

•

•

•

•

6

•

Pts
10
30

•

10

8

•

5

•

6

•

•
•

•

•

•

7
3

•

•

•

•
•

12
8
x0.1
43

28

30

35

29
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V. CASE STUDY: DEVOLUTION OF WETLANDS PROTECTION
RESPONSIBILITY
The purpose of this brief case study is to gain insight into the impact
that devolution will have in the wetlands context. Although the potential
devolution of Clean Water Act authority following SWANCC would impact
much more than wetlands,140 wetlands do make for a compelling study for
the following reasons: (1) only sixteen states141 have existing wetlands
protections, meaning that many states would have to adopt new rules in the
event of a federal rollback; and (2) wetlands continue to be major targets
for development.142
Results are reported both with and without Alaska’s wetlands included
in the national total. With more wetlands in Alaska than the rest of the
140. The Supreme Court limited the scope of the term granting jurisdiction to, “waters of the
United States,” which is used in parts of the Clean Water Act other than just § 404. See N. Cook
County. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163-164 (2001).
141. Sixteen states have independent (nonfederal) wetlands protections: Connecticut, Florida,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The other two-thirds of states
depend on the Federal wetlands programs. And just because there are existing state protections does not
mean those protections necessarily cover all wetlands. Ass’n of State Wetlands Mgrs., State Wetland
Programs, available at http://www.aswm.org/swp/states.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
142. As of 2000, the Corps averaged around 80,000 nationwide and general permits each year, and
5,000 individual permits. See http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/releases/nationwidepermits.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2004).
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states combined, the results are excessively skewed, and may create a
misleading statistical picture.
As a second preliminary matter, there is no distinction made here
between the quality or type of wetlands. While this is certainly a useful
avenue for future analysis, only total acreages are examined here.143 Thus,
the question of whether wetlands are “isolated” or not, and the corollary
question of what “isolated” means, are totally avoided. This analysis is
simply to gain an understanding of how legal limitations to state
rulemaking are related to actual wetland endowments.
The first question is how many acres of wetlands are in states that are
subject to either NMSRs or PPRAs.144 The number of acres in states
subject to any kind of NMSR is approximately 220 million acres. These
represent 77% of the wetlands in the United States (42% excluding
Alaska). The number of acres subject to generally applicable NMSRs is
approximately 35 million acres. These represent approximately 12% of
wetlands in the United States (30% excluding Alaska).

Figure 1: Cumulative Percentages of Total U.S.
W etland Acres in States with No More Stringent
Rules, by Stringency

Cumulative Percent

143. The acreage estimates are drawn from U.S. Geological Survey, National Water Summary on
90%
Wetland
Resources (1999), available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/ (last visited Nov. 27,
2004).80%
In some cases, wetland acreages were reported as a percentage of total state acreage. In these
cases, wetland acreages were estimated by multiplying the percentage by the total acreage. All
All
70%
estimates
are rough approximations.
No Alaska
144.60%
For purposes of the NMSR analysis here in the wetlands context, Wisconsin (which does have
a NMSR) is being excluded because of its preemptive gap-filling measure. See supra note 29 and
50%
accompanying text. An analysis focusing on a water quality issue other than wetlands should not
40%exclude Wisconsin’s NMSR.
necessarily
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Figure 1 shows the cumulative percentages of wetland acres in each
stringency class. Because of the strong influence of Alaska and its limited
applicability rule, most of the total wetland acres in the United States are in
fact subject to some kind of NMSR. Nonetheless, even when Alaska is
excluded, the cumulative percentage does not drop below 25% until the
stringency class of 30-40.
The number of wetland acres in states subject to any kind of PPRA is
approximately 60 million acres. These represent 21% of the total wetland
acres in the United States (52% excluding Alaska). The number of acres
subject to generally applicable PPRAs is approximately 40 million acres.
These represent approximately 14% of wetlands in the United States (34%
excluding Alaska).

Figure 2: Cum ulative Percentages of Total U.S.
W etland Acres in States w ith Private Property Rights
Acts, by Stringency

mulative Percentage

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

All
No Alaska
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Figure 2 shows the cumulative percentages of wetland acres in each
stringency class. Because Alaska does not have a PPRA, the results are
skewed to the low end while the state is included. But when Alaska is
removed, one can see that more than half of the wetland acres in the
remainder of the United States are subject to some kind of PPRA.
Furthermore, the cumulative percentage does not fall below 25% until the
40-50 class, and the highest stringency class still holds about 10% of the
wetlands in the United States.
If we consider the combined effects: The number of acres subject to
either a NMSR, PPRA, or both, is approximately 251 million acres. These
represent around 88% of the wetlands in the United States (70% excluding
Alaska). If only generally applicable NMSRs and PPRAs are included, the
total acreage is approximately 55 million acres. These represent 19% of the
country’s wetlands; 48% if Alaska is excluded. Thus, about half of the
wetlands in the contiguous United States are subject to at least one of the
generally applicable legal limitations to state rulemaking.
From this brief analysis, one can conclude that well more than half of
the country’s wetlands are in states that may experience difficulty filling in
the gap in the event of a federal rollback. Of course, it is unlikely at this
time that all wetlands will lose federal protections. But if one assumes that
there is some correlation between the number of “isolated” wetlands and
the number of total wetlands in any given state, then this analysis can be
used as a starting point for predicting the actual number of wetlands that
may lose protection.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Before federal policymakers choose to devolve their responsibility for
environmental protection to the states, they should consider the potential
for limitations that states impose on themselves to interfere with the
assumption of such responsibility. In terms of the original question,
whether states could indeed maintain existing levels of environmental
protection in the absence of current federal programs, this paper suggests
that the gap-filling process, on a national scale, would be made more
difficult because of “no more stringent” rules and private property rights
acts. “No more stringent” rules represent outright obstacles to rulemaking;
Private property rights acts serve as deterrents. In both cases, they inhibit
states from protecting environmental resources to the same extent as the
federal government.
Thirty-five states have at least one—if not both—of these legal
limitations to gap-filling. In the wetlands context alone, these states contain
approximately 88% of the nation’s wetlands. In the event of a federal
rollback, these wetlands, as well as other natural resources, could
consequently receive lowered levels of environmental protection.
Of course, neither NMSRs nor PPRAs have undergone meaningful
legal challenges to date. It is entirely possible that courts will limit the
applicability of these limitations if they are triggered by state rules filling in
for a federal rollback. If a court were to determine, for example, that a
particular NMSR does not apply to jurisdictional boundaries, that NMSR
would present little obstacle to gap-filling in the SWANCC context.
But this uncertainty over interpretation is no reason for devolution to
proceed without considering the potential environmental consequences. If
maintaining current levels of protection is indeed a goal, these self-imposed
legal limitations must not be ignored.

